Clear as Mud: Pleasant Grove City v. Summun and Riding the Undefined Line between Government Speech and Private Speech in a Public Forum by Thornhill, Jessica L.
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 30 
Issue 1 Vol. 30 Iss. 1 Article 8 
2012 
Clear as Mud: Pleasant Grove City v. Summun and Riding the 
Undefined Line between Government Speech and Private Speech 
in a Public Forum 
Jessica L. Thornhill 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
30 Miss. C. L. Rev. 121 (2011-2012) 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
CLEAR AS MUD: PLEASANT GROVE CITY v. SUMMUM
AND RIDING THE UNDEFINED LINE BETWEEN
GOVERNMENT SPEECH AND PRIVATE
SPEECH IN A PUBLIC FORUM
Jessica L. Thornhill*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent history, the status of the government's own speech has come
into question in relation to the constitutional guarantee of free speech
under the First Amendment. The United States Supreme Court addressed
this dilemma in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum holding that a privately
donated Ten Commandments monument displayed in a public park was
not subject to First Amendment scrutiny because the monument consti-
tuted government speech that Pleasant Grove City had effectively accepted
as its own.' The Pleasant Grove decision is important, because the Court
focuses on government speech rather than focusing solely on the type of
forum involved.
This Note argues that while the Supreme Court's holding in Pleasant
Grove appears well reasoned and fully justified as to the law, the Court
fails to fully analyze the forum at issue, thus leaving a hurdle in distinguish-
ing government speech from private speech in a public forum. The hole in
the analysis leaves the opinion open to criticism and ultimately in need of
clarification. By adopting an analysis that fully discusses the status of the
forum, rather than merely making assumptions about the nature of the fo-
rum, the holding would provide a much clearer precedent to lower courts.
Part I of this Note discusses the relevant facts and reasoning consid-
ered by the Court in reaching its decision; part II provides the background
of prior case law applicable to the relevant issues; part III explains Pleasant
Grove's holding, including the arguments presented and the rationalization
of the Court; part IV analyzes Pleasant Grove's holding and lays out a new
three-pronged approach to analyzing issues regarding government speech.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the entire faculty and administration at Mississippi
College School of Law, especially Professor Donald Campbell for his continuous guidance throughout
the preparation, development, and drafting of this Note. His insight, expertise, and enthusiasm were
essential to the end product and contributed greatly to my growth as a student. Lastly, I am forever
indebted to my husband, Matthew, and my parents, Rusty and Kim Lenard, for their continuous
support and encouragement throughout my law school career.
1. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1130 (2009).
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II. FACTS
A. Procedural History
In 2005, Summum, a religious organization, filed a complaint against
the City of Pleasant Grove, Utah (the "City") and various local officials
alleging violations of the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. 2 The ac-
tion arose when the City allowed a Ten Commandments monument to be
erected in a public park, but rejected a Seven Aphorisms of Summum mon-
ument within the same park. Summum filed suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Utah requesting a preliminary injunction to
require the City to allow Summum to erect its monument in Pioneer Park.4
The court denied Summum's request for an injunction.5 Summum subse-
quently appealed its free speech claim to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit.'
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, noting a previ-
ous holding that a Ten Commandments monument constituted private
speech rather than government speech, because public parks are tradition-
ally regarded as public forums.' The Tenth Circuit also held that the City
could not reject Summum's request to erect the Seven Aphorisms monu-
ment unless it had a "compelling justification," and therefore held that the
City had to allow Summum to erect its monument.8
Subsequently, the City requested a re-hearing en banc, which the
Tenth Circuit denied.9 The City then appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court, which granted certiorari on the questions of whether the
Tenth Circuit erred in holding that the privately donated monument that
was thereafter owned, controlled, and displayed by the City was not gov-
ernment speech but private speech of the monument's donor, and whether
the Tenth Circuit erred by ruling that a city park is a public forum for the
erection and permanent display of privately donated monuments.10
B. Factual Summary
Located in the historic district of Pleasant Grove, Utah, Pioneer Park







8. Id.; see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. granted,
552 U.S. 1294 (Mar. 31, 2008) (No. 07-665).




which were donated by private individuals or groups." These eleven mon-
uments consist of a wishing well; a historic granary; the City's first fire sta-
tion; a September 11 monument; and a Ten Commandments monument,
which was donated in 1971 by the Fraternal Order of Eagles.' 2
Beginning in 2003, Summum wished to donate a monument to Pioneer
Park and wrote two separate letters to Pleasant Grove's Mayor requesting
permission to construct a stone monument of the "Seven Aphorisms of
Summum."' 3 The monument was to be similar to the Ten Commandments
monument currently in the park, but the City denied Summum's request.14
In its denial, the City explained that it only allowed monuments in Pioneer
Park that (1) directly related to the history of the City, or (2) were donated
"by groups with longstanding ties to the Pleasant Grove Community."15
In 2005, Summum again wrote to the City's mayor requesting to build
the Seven Aphorisms of Summum monument, but did not mention the
monument's religious nature or its historical significance or connection to
the City.' 6 The City again rejected Summum's request, and Summum sub-
sequently filed suit."
C. Disposition
Prior to Pleasant Grove, the United States Supreme Court had never
addressed the Free Speech Clause's application to a government entity's
acceptance of monuments in a public park.18 The Supreme Court reversed
the Tenth Circuit's judgment, holding that "the placement of a permanent
monument in a public park is best viewed as a form of government speech
and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause."1 9
The City argued in favor of recognizing monuments as government free
speech because the government entity selects which monuments it wants to
display.2" To the contrary, Summum argued that government speech
11. Id. at 1129.
12. Id.
13. Id. The Seven Aphorisms of Sunmum are at the center of the Summum faith in which fol-
lowers believe that the Seven Aphorisms were inscribed on the original tablets handed down by God to
Moses on Mount Sinai, but that Moses shared the aphorisms only with a few and then destroyed the
original tablets; followers believe Moses destroyed the tablets because he believed that the Israelites
were not ready to receive the Aphorisms, and thus returned to Mount Sinai with a second set of tablets
containing the Ten Commandments. Id. at 1129 n.1 (citing The Aphorisms of Summum and the Ten
Commandments, http://www.summum.us/philosophy/tencommandments.shtml (last visited Feb. 15,
2011)). The Seven Aphorisms, also known as the Seven Principles of Creation, are as follows: "(1) The
principle of Psychokinesis, (2) the principle of Correspondence, (3) the principle of Vibration, (4) the
principle of Opposition, (5) the principle of Rhythm, (6) the principle of Cause and Effect, and (7) the
principle of Gender." Seven Summum Principles, http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtml
(last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
14. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1130.
15. Id. (citation omitted).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1131.
19. Id. at 1129.
20. Id. at 1133.
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should not be used to favor certain speakers over others based on view-
point; instead, the government entity should embrace the monument's mes-
sage as its own. 1 Justice Alito delivered the majority opinion.2 2 Justice
Stevens concurred and was joined by Justice Ginsburg. 3 Justice Scalia
filed a concurring opinion that was joined by Justice Thomas.24 Justices
Breyer and Souter also wrote separate concurring opinions. 2 5
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
According to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." 2 6 In
Pleasant Grove, the Court took a different approach, diverging from tradi-
tional analysis of government free speech. To understand the Court's shift
in approach, it is important to review the history of the Court's analysis of
government free speech. The following caselaw represents the Supreme
Court's interpretation of free speech regarding public and nonpublic fo-
rums provided by government entities and the progression of free speech
on government property.
A. Defining the Character of Government Property in Regards to
Free Speech Access Under the First Amendment
In Pleasant Grove, the Court relied on a prominent free speech case
from 1983, Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n.7In
Perry, the Supreme Court held that preferential access to an interschool
mail system did not violate the First Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.2 8 There, Perry Education Associa-
tion (PEA), the union representing Perry School teachers, entered a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with the Board of Education to provide PEA
exclusive access to the interschool mail system, but no other union.29 The
Court held that the guarantee of free speech under the First Amendment
applied to teachers' mailboxes, but did not necessarily require equivalent
access and depends on the character of the property at issue.3 0
Next, the Perry Court categorized the types of property for permissive
exclusions: the traditional public forum, the public forum, and the nonpub-
lic forum. The Court stated that streets and parks "have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public, and, . . . have been used for
21. Id. at 1134.
22. Id. at 1128.
23. Id. at 1138.
24. Id. at 1139.
25. Id. at 1140-41.
26. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
27. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
28. Id. at 38-55.
29. Id at 38-39.
30. Id. at 4.
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purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and dis-
cussing public questions," thus traditional public forums. 3 1 The govern-
ment may not prohibit all communicative activity in these public forums,
and for any content-based exclusion, the government must show a compel-
ling state interest that the regulation is necessary; however, the government
may impose content-neutral regulations that are designed to serve a "sig-
nificant government interest." 32
Then, the Court addressed a second category, the limited public fo-
rum, where the government has opened public property for use by the pub-
lic for expressive activity.3 In this category, the Constitution prohibits the
government from enforcing certain exclusions, because this serves as a type
of public forum, even though the government was not obligated to create
it.34 Because it serves as a public forum, as long as it is open, the govern-
ment is bound by the same regulations that apply to traditional public fo-
rums; thus, "[r]easonable time, place[,] and manner regulations are
permissible, and a[ny] content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn
to effectuate a compelling state interest."3 5
The Court defined a third category, the non-public forum, as public
property that is not traditionally designated as a public forum and is gov-
erned by different standards, seeing that the "First Amendment does not
guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by
the government." 6 Here, the government may impose content-based re-
strictions, but may not discriminate according to a particular viewpoint.37
The Perry Court further held that because the mailboxes were not open to
the general public, the government property was not a public forum and
the government was allowed to restrict access.38 In regards to these non-
public forums, Perry held that the government has the right to make "dis-
tinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity," but
must be reasonable in regards to the purpose of the forum and concluded
the following:
When speakers and subjects are similarly situated, the state
may not pick and choose. Conversely on government prop-
erty that has not been made a public forum, not all speech is
equally situated, and the state may draw distinctions which
relate to the special purpose for which the property is
used.3 9




35. Id at 46 (citation omitted).
36. Id. (citation omitted).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 47-48.
39. Id. at 55.
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In other words, the government may discriminate in non-public forums
based on content, depending on how the government property is used and
the purpose of the forum in question.
In 1985, the Supreme Court revisited speech exclusion from govern-
ment property in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.40 There, the Supreme Court addressed whether the federal gov-
ernment violated the First Amendment by excluding certain political advo-
cacy organizations from a charity drive.4 ' The lower courts felt the
exclusion violated the First Amendment.4 2 However, the Supreme Court
reversed the lower court decisions and held that the federal government's
speech was protected; although the government was not speaking, it was
operating a non-public forum on public property and the government's rea-
sons for excluding the political organizations satisfied the reasonableness
standard.43
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor further stated that "[n]othing
in the Constitution requires the [g]overnment freely to grant access to all
who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of
[g]overnment property without regard to the nature of the property or to
the disruption that might be caused by the speaker's activities."" Because
the government, like any owner of private property, has the power "to pre-
serve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedi-
cated,"4 5 the Court adopted a method of forum analysis aimed at
determining whether the government's interest in using the property for its
intended purpose "outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the prop-
erty for other purposes. "46
Whether the government can deny access depends on the type of fo-
rum in question.4 7 The Court relied on Perry to determine that with regard
to public forums, because they are designed for the free exchange of ideas,
speakers can only be denied access only if the exclusion serves "a compel-
ling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that inter-
est."4 8 However, nonpublic forums are a different story, as access can be
denied as long as the exclusions are "reasonable and [are] not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's
view.
[A] speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he
wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the pur-
pose of the forum, or if he is not a member of the class of
40. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
41. Id. at 790.
42. Id. at 796.
43. Id. at 797-813.
44. Id. at 799-800.
45. Id. at 800 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
49. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46).
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speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was created,
the government violates the First Amendment when it de-
nies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view
he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.50
The Court then applied a reasonable standard, stating that "[t]he
[g]overnment's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only
be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable
limitation."" The Court ultimately concluded that the government did not
violate the First Amendment when it excluded the political organization
based on the reasonableness of the government's limitations on access.5 2
The Supreme Court again addressed this issue, specifically viewpoint
discrimination, in Rust v. Sullivan, a 1991 case in which Rust argued that
the
regulations violate[d] the First Amendment by impermissi-
bly discriminating based on viewpoint because they prohibit
"all discussion about abortion as a lawful option-including
counseling, referral, and the provision of neutral and accu-
rate information about ending a pregnancy-while compel-
ling the clinic or counselor to provide information that
promotes continuing a pregnancy to term."53
In Rust, the Court held that the government can constitutionally
choose to fund certain programs which it feels are in the public's interest,
without having to fund an alternative program.5 4 This is not considered
viewpoint discrimination, but merely a selection to fund one activity, with-
out funding another. 5 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist fur-
ther stated: "To hold that the [g]overnment unconstitutionally
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program
dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the program in ad-
vancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render
numerous [g]overnment programs constitutionally suspect."56
The Supreme Court continued its discussion of viewpoint discrimina-
tion in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District."
There, the school district denied access to school property that was other-
wise permitted for after-hours use including social, civic, and recreational
activities, but did not include religious purposes.5 8 Lamb's Chapel wished
to show a film series on Christian family values dealing with family and
50. Id. at 806 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 808.
52. Id. at 813.
53. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991).
54. Id. at 193.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 194.
57. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
58. Id. at 386.
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child-rearing issues faced by parents today, but was denied access to the
facilities.5 9 The Court held that
[w]ith respect to public property that is not a designated
public forum open for indiscriminate public use for commu-
nicative purposes, we have said that "[c]ontrol over access
to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and
speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are rea-
sonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are
viewpoint neutral."6 0
Justice White wrote that it was clear that the film series involved a
subject that was otherwise permissible under the regulations but was de-
nied solely because it involved a religious viewpoint; therefore, the school
board exclusion was in violation of the First Amendment because "the First
Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor
some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others."61
Next, the Supreme Court undertook Rosenberger v. Rector and Visi-
tors of the University of Virginia involving a limited public forum;62 the
Court has relied on this case quite heavily in recent years to distinguish
content discrimination from viewpoint discrimination. Rosenberger in-
volved the University of Virginia's use of mandatory student activity fees to
pay for printing costs of various student group publications and refusal to
pay for a student newspaper that reflected a Christian perspective.6 3 The
district court granted summary judgment for the university, and the Fourth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the university violation of the Constitution's
Free Speech Clause by viewpoint discrimination was justified in order to
comply with the Constitution's Establishment Clause.6' However, the Su-
preme Court overturned the Fourth Circuit's decision, holding that the uni-
versity's actions denied the student organization its free speech rights and
the university's guidelines violated principles governing speech in limited
public forums.65
When determining whether a state has legitimate power to exclude
certain speech on government property, the Court distinguished content
discrimination (speech discrimination based on subject matter, which may
or may not be permissible based on whether it preserves the limited fo-
rum's purpose) from viewpoint discrimination (speech discrimination
based on the speaker's motivating ideology, opinion, or perspective, which
59. Id. at 387.
60. Id. at 392-93 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985) (citations omitted)).
61. Id. (quoting City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)).
62. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
63. Id. at 823-27.
64. Id. at 827-28.
65. Id. at 828-37.
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is generally unacceptable if the speech is otherwise within the forum's limi-
tations).6 6 The Supreme Court held that the university's actions were view-
point discrimination and thus impermissible because the university's
policies did not exclude religion as a subject matter, but disfavored student
publications with religious viewpoints.6 7 Furthermore, the Court held that
viewpoint neutrality is essential when the government is funding the mes-
sage so to prevent unfair discrimination. 68
Additionally, the Court held that the university's violation was not jus-
tified by the necessity of complying with the Establishment Clause, because
the program at issue was neutral in regards to religion.6 9 When faced with
an Establishment Clause violation, neutrality is not offended "when the
government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends
benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious
ones, are broad and diverse."70 There would have been more cause for
concern if the university created the program to advance religion or aid a
religious cause; however, that was not the university's intent with the pro-
gram.71 The program was merely instituted to provide a forum for speech
and to support various student groups, including the publication of
newspapers.72
The Court concluded that it was not necessary to deny eligibility to
student publications based on their viewpoint to prevent an Establishment
Clause violation, because in doing so, the university violated the Free
Speech Clause through viewpoint discrimination based on religion, which
"could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires."73
The Establishment Clause is not violated if a public university grants funds
on a religion-neutral basis to a wide array of student groups, even if some
of those groups use the funds for secular activities. 74
Next, the Supreme Court considered Good News Club v. Milford Cen-
tral School, a case where Milford Central School had enacted a policy al-
lowing residents to use its facilities after hours for various educational and
social gatherings.75 In doing so, Milford denied a request to use the build-
ing for weekly after-school meetings by Good News Club, a private Chris-
tian organization for children.76 Milford equated the proposed meetings to
religious worship, which was prohibited by the community use policy. 77
66. Id. at 829-30.
67. Id. at 831.
68. Id. at 834.
69. Id. at 838-40.
70. Id. at 839 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704
(1994)).
71. Id. at 840.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 845-46.
74. Id. at 842-46.
75. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102-03 (2001).
76. Id. at 103.
77. Id.
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The Supreme Court based its holding on the parties' agreement that
Milford operated a limited public forum, and in such instances, the govern-
ment is not required to allow all types of speech. The government may
reserve the forum for "certain groups or for the discussion of certain top-
ics," but is limited from discriminating against speech based on viewpoint,
and any restrictions must be "reasonable in light of the purpose served by
the forum."7  The Court relied on its previous holdings in Lamb's Chapel
and Rosenberger when it determined that Milford's actions were viewpoint
discrimination based on the request's religious nature.80 The Court held
that Milford opened the limited public forum to serve the community, and
as such, "any group that 'promote[d] the moral and character development
of children' [was] eligible to use the school building."8 '
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its holdings in Lamb's Chapel and
Rosenburger, finding that "speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects
cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the ground that the
subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint."8 2 Therefore, the Court
concluded that by refusing Good News Club's request, Milford engaged in
viewpoint discrimination based on Good News Club's religious
perspective.8 3
The most recent case cited by the Pleasant Grove Court is Johanns v.
Livestock Marketing Ass'n, wherein the Supreme Court addressed govern-
ment speech in a "compelled-subsidy" case, where an "individual [was] re-
quired by the government to subsidize a message he disagree[d]
with . . . ."84 The Court held that beef advertising funded by mandatory
contributions under the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 198585 was
"government speech" and therefore not susceptible to the First Amend-
ment "compelled-subsidy" scrutiny.8 6
To determine whether the speech was that of the government, the
Court looked to the root of the promotional campaign, which was effec-
tively controlled by the federal government because Congress and the Sec-
retary of Agriculture implemented it.87 When the government controls the
message and a government entity approved every work communicated, the
government "is not precluded from relying on the government speech doc-
trine merely because it solicits assistance from non-governmental sources
in developing specific messages."" The Livestock Marketing Association
argued that the advertisements could not be "government speech" because
78. id. at 106.
79. Id. at 106-07 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal DefL & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985)).
80. Id. at 107.
81. Id. at 108 (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 111-12.
83. Id- at 112.
84. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005).
85. Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354, 1597 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2918 (2006)).
86. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 554-67.
87. Id. at 560-61.
88. Id. at 562.
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they were attributed to "America's Beef Producers" and not the govern-
ment, and "America's Beef Producers" were compelled to fund the mes-
sage that they disagreed with which allowed them to raise a First
Amendment claim. 89 However, the Court refused to address the argu-
ment's validity, holding that it related to "compelled-speech" rather than
"compelled-subsidy."9 0 The Court further held that "citizens may chal-
lenge compelled support of private speech, but have no First Amendment
right not to fund government speech" even when funding is achieved
through congressional acts.91
B. The Progression of the Government Speech Doctrine
As Justice Stevens stated in his concurring opinion in the instant case,
the government free speech doctrine is a newly minted doctrine, as its
boundaries are not well known or developed.9 2 Therefore, an overview of
the government speech doctrine will assist in understanding the Court's de-
cision in Pleasant Grove and grasp the Court's expansion of the doctrine.
The premise of the government speech doctrine is that the government
should be allowed to promote its own policies.93 This premise has led to
the Court's development of the doctrine that when the government is
speaking for itself, it is not bound by the same free speech guarantees af-
forded to private speech. In 1995, the Supreme Court recognized that
"when the [s]tate is the speaker, it may make content-based choices" not
subject to First Amendment scrutiny, as "[t]he purpose of the First Amend-
ment is to protect private expression and nothing in the guarantee pre-
cludes the government from controlling its own expression." 94 In Keller v.
State Bar of California, the Court held that the government must be able to
express certain viewpoints in order to function and would not be able to do
so effectively if the government was not allowed preferences. 95
The government speech doctrine was first recognized in 1991 with the
Court in Rust holding that regulations regarding abortion funding did not
violate the Free Speech Clause and allowed the government to restrict the
free speech rights of the abortion clinics to talk about abortions.9 6 The
Court again addressed the topic ten years later in Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez, but did not find that the speech in question was that of the
government. 9 7 In 2006, the Supreme Court focused on the speech of gov-
ernment officials in Garcetti v. Ceballos and held that "when public em-
ployees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees
89. Id. at 564.
90. Id. at 564-65.
91. Id.
92. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009).
93. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
94. Id. at 834; Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'I Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 n.7 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
95. Keller v. State Bd. of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12 (1990).
96. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
97. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes. ."98 The day
before deciding the instant case, the Supreme Court decided Ysursa v.
Pocatello Education Ass'n and also addressed government speech.99 In
Ysursa, the Court reiterated the holdings in both Rust and Keller, holding
that a state must be able to regulate speech so as to achieve governmental
objectives and further holding "the government function trumps the value
of the speech at issue, and a private citizen's First Amendment rights take a
back seat to the government's own." 0
In deciding these cases, the Court categorized the government's rela-
tionship to the restricted speech to determine whether the government's
interest was sufficient to preclude free speech scrutiny.'0 ' However, the
government speech doctrine has garnered criticism due to the difficulty in
determining when the government is speaking for itself and when it is aid-
ing private speech; therefore, lower courts are left without a clear test to
address government speech.102
C. The Establishment Clause's Influence on Government Speech
Although the Court in Pleasant Grove deferred discussion of the Es-
tablishment Clause, the Establishment Clause can prove to be problematic
with regard to free speech on government property. The Establishment
Clause provides for the free exercise of religion and prohibits the govern-
ment from enacting laws that promote one religion over another or from
supporting religious ideals.103 In the following cases, the Supreme Court
addressed possible Establishment Clause violations in allowing speech in
government forums.
In 1981, the Supreme Court held in Widmar v. Vincent that the Univer-
sity of Missouri-Kansas City discriminated against student groups who
wished to use an open forum for religious worship and discussion, which
are protected forms of First Amendment free speech.' 04 The Court further
held that the only way to justify this type of discrimination was to show a
compelling state interest in prohibiting the speech.' 05
The Supreme Court used a three-prong test to determine if a policy
would offend the Establishment Clause: "First, the [governmental policy]
must have a secular legislative purpose;. second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally,
the [policy] must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' 0 6 In Widmar, the Supreme Court focused on the third prong.'0o
98. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
99. The Supreme Court 2008 Term Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 242, 250 (2009).
100. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009); see also Rust, 500 U.S. at 194; Keller,
500 U.S. at 173.
101. The Supreme Court 2008 Term Leading Cases, supra note 99, at 248.
102. The Supreme Court 2008 Term Leading Cases, supra note 99, at 238.
103. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
104. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 271 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
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The Court stated that "an open forum in a public university does not confer
any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices" just as
"such a policy 'would no more commit the [u]niversity . . . to religious
goals' than it is 'now committed to the goals of the Students for a Demo-
cratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance,' or any other group eligible to
use its facilities."108 Finally, the Court concluded that the university cre-
ated a forum generally open to student groups, but then sought to exclude
religious speech which "violate[d] the fundamental principle that a state
regulation of speech should be content-neutral," and could not be
justified.10 9
As previously mentioned, in Good News Club, the Supreme Court not
only addressed First Amendment concerns, but also concerns regarding a
potential Establishment Clause violation. Milford argued that, even if its
rejection of the club was viewpoint discrimination, the rejection was re-
quired in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause; however, the
Supreme Court disagreed." 0 The Supreme Court stated that "a state inter-
est in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation 'may be characterized as
compelling,' and therefore may justify content-based discrimination. How-
ever, it is not clear whether a [s]tate's interest in avoiding an Establishment
Clause violation would justify viewpoint discrimination."111
The Court had previously held that "a significant factor in upholding
governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack [was]
their neutrality towards religion," but the Court was not persuaded by
Milford's argument.112 In particular, Milford argued that granting Good
News Club access would damage the policy's neutrality, because the "guar-
antee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government, fol-
lowing neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to
recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are
broad and diverse."11 3 The Court concluded that there was no valid reason
to prohibit Good News Club from meeting on the schools premises because
it did not violate the Establishment Clause.114
Another important Supreme Court opinion was Van Orden v. Perry,
which was factually similar to Pleasant Grove."15 Although the Supreme
Court chose not to follow the same analysis in Pleasant Grove, it is impor-
tant to illustrate the distinction between the two opinions. The United
States Supreme Court considered Van Orden in 2005. The Van Orden case
involved a Ten Commandments monument located on the premises of the
107. Id. at 271-72.
108. Id. at 274 (quoting Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1317 (8th Cir. 1980)).
109. Id. at 277.
110. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112-13 (2001).
111. Id. at 112 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 114 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839
(1995)).
113. Id. (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839).
114. Id. at 119.
115. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
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Texas State Capitol that was donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles of
Texas in 1961.16 The monument was one of seventeen monuments on the
grounds that commemorated the "people, ideals, and events that com-
pose[d] Texan identity."1 17 The Court ultimately concluded that the Estab-
lishment Clause did not prohibit the display of the Ten Commandments
monument on the Texas State Capitol grounds.11 8
In its determination, the Court's analysis focused on the monument's
nature and the nation's history of acknowledging religion's role in Ameri-
can life." 9 The Court stated that "[w]hile the Commandments are relig-
ious, they have an undeniable historical meaning. Simply having religious
content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does
not run afoul of the Establishment Clause."120 However, the Court ac-
knowledged limits to the government's display of religious messages or
symbols by recognizing the unconstitutionality of posting of the Ten Com-
mandments in every public classroom.12 1 The monument was held to be
constitutional because its placement was "a far more passive use of the
[Ten Commandments]" than a daily display to elementary students. 1 2 2
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Breyer stated: "Despite the Command-
ments' religious message, an inquiry into the context in which the text of
the Commandments is used demonstrates that the Commandments also
convey a secular moral message about proper standards of social conduct
and a message about the historic relation between those standards and the
law."123 Justice Breyer also stated that individuals visiting the capitol
grounds were more likely to view the Ten Commandments as a moral and
historical message rather than for its religious value or principles. 124
IV. PLEASANT GROVE CITY V. SUMMUM
A. Majority Opinion
In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Supreme Court addressed an
issue of first impression involving the application of the Free Speech Clause
to a government entity's acceptance of a privately donated, permanent
monument for installation in a public park.125 Authored by Justice Alito,
the Court held that the City's decision to allow such a monument was a
form of government free speech not subject to scrutiny under the Free
Speech Clause. 12 6
116. Id. at 681.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 677.
119. Id. at 686.
120. Id. at 678.
121. Id. at 690-91 (referencing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980)).
122. Id. at 691.
123. Id. at 679.
124. Id. at 701.
125. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (citing U.S. CONsT. amend I).
126. Id. at 1138.
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In reaching its decision, the Court addressed the fundamental disa-
greement between the petitioner, the City, and respondent, Summum, on
whether the petitioner was engaged in its own expressive conduct or
whether it was providing a forum for private speech-and thus, whether
the correct precedent to decide the case involved government speech or
private speech in a public forum.127
The City favored previous cases involving government speech,
whereas Summum, on the other hand, agreed with the Court of Appeals,
favoring cases involving private speech in a public forum.128 If the Court
had held that the monument was private speech in a public forum, then the
speech would have to have been evaluated as to content and viewpoint
discrimination to determine if the City was violating Summum's right to
free speech, as private speech is protected by the First Amendment. On
the other hand, had the Court adopted a government speech analysis, the
City would not have been subjected to such scrutiny because government
speech is not protected under the First Amendment. The government is
allowed to discriminate based on content in order to fulfill its basic gov-
erning functions, so long as the discrimination is justified.
Recognizing the difficulty in differentiating between the two catego-
ries of speech, the Court held permanent monuments displayed on public
property represented government speech and that the City was engaged in
its own expressive conduct; therefore, the Free Speech Clause did not apply
because it restricted government regulation of private speech but did not
regulate government speech.129 The Court reasoned that a government en-
tity has the right to speak for itself, to say what it wishes, and to select the
views that it wants to express.130 Although the Free Speech Clause does
not regulate government speech, government speech is limited by the Es-
tablishment Clause of the Constitution, which prevents the government
from becoming entangled with religion.' 3 1
The Court set out its reasoning: "Just as government-commissioned
and government-financed monuments speak for the government, so do pri-
vately financed and donated monuments that the government accepts and
displays to the public on government land," because persons who observe
the monuments would reasonably interpret them as conveying a message
on the property owner's behalf.132 Governments have long used monu-
ments to speak to the public. Throughout American history, government
entities generally have been selective in regards to donated monuments.133
Private parties have donated many well-known American monuments such
127. Id. at 1131.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1131-32.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1132.
132. Id. at 1133.
133. Id.
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as the Statue of Liberty, the Iwo Jima monument, and the Vietnam Memo-
rial. 134 By accepting these privately funded monuments, government enti-
ties save valuable tax dollars and are able to acquire monuments they
would not be able to afford otherwise.13 5 But in accepting these monu-
ments, government entities select monuments they feel "portray what they
feel is appropriate for the place in question," and exercise selectivity by
controlling submission requirements, design input, modifications, written
criteria, and legislative approval of specific content.13 6 This selection pro-
cess shows that the monuments that are chosen "are meant to convey and
have the effect of conveying a government message" and thus constitute
government speech.137
Applying the rule to the instant case, the Court held that the monu-
ments in the City's Pioneer Park represented government speech because
the City decided which monuments it would accept; therefore, the City
"'effectively controlled' the messages sent by the monuments in the [p]ark
by exercising 'final approval authority' over their selection." 3 8 The City
selected the monuments based on whether they presented an image of the
City that it wished to project to all park visitors.13 9
In addition, Summum argued that government speech should not be
used to allow favoritism of certain private speakers based on their view-
points.140 Summum suggested that the government entity should be re-
quired to go through a formal process to adopt a resolution embracing the
monument's message; however, the Court disagreed, stating that the formal
documentation was not necessary because a monument's message is subjec-
tive and can change over time.' 41 When a city accepts a privately donated
monument and places it on city property, the city is engaged in expressive
conduct; however, "the intended and perceived significance of that con-
duct" may not be the same intended by the monument's donor or crea-
tor.142 "By accepting such a monument, a government entity does not
necessarily endorse the specific meaning that any particular donor sees in
the monument."143 Interpretation of the "message" conveyed by a monu-
ment may change over time as "historical interpretations" and "the society
around them changes."144
Summum and the Tenth Circuit compared privately donated monu-
ments in a public park to delivery of speeches or holding marches or dem-
onstrations in public, therefore contending that the public park was a
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1133-34.
137. Id. at 1134.
138. Id. (citation omitted).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1134, 1136.
142. Id. at 1135, 1138.
143. Id. at 1135.
144. Id. at 1136, 1138 (citations omitted).
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"traditional public forum for these activities." 14 5 However, the Supreme
Court held that these public forum principles were out of place in this case;
although a public park may accommodate a large number of public speak-
ers, it can only accommodate a limited number of permanent monu-
ments. 146 Speeches and demonstrations undoubtedly come to an end,
whereas monuments last for a significant period of time and "interfere per-
manently with other uses of public space," thus monopolizing the land's
use.147
Ultimately, the Supreme Court overruled the Tenth Circuit's decision
and held that a government entity's decision to accept or reject a privately
donated monument is a form of government speech not subject to the Free
Speech Clause on the grounds that "[i]f government entities must maintain
viewpoint neutrality in their selection of donated monuments, they must
either 'brace themselves for an influx of clutter' or face the pressure to
remove longstanding and cherished monuments." 148 The Court further
held that "if public parks were considered to be traditional public forums
for the purpose of erecting privately donated monuments, most parks
would have little choice but to refuse all such donations."149
B. Justice Stevens's Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Ginsburg
joined.15 0 Justice Stevens agreed with the Court's holding, but stated that
the monument could be characterized as an implicit endorsement of the
donor's message instead of government speech.' 5 ' Justice Stevens stated
that previous precedent involving the government speech doctrine was lim-
ited and the majority opinion did not expand it.15 2 He recognized that gov-
ernment speech via permanent displays on public property would not give
the government a "free license to communicate offensive or partisan
messages."153 Justice Stevens further stated that although the Free Speech
Clause does not restrict government speech, "government speakers are
bound by the Constitution's other proscriptions, including those supplied
by the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses," which, along with
checks imposed by democracy, ensure the limited effect of the majority's
holding.154
145. Id. at 1137.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1138.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1138-39.
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C. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Thomas
joined. 5 5 Justice Scalia agreed fully with the majority's analysis pertaining
to the Free Speech Clause, but he also felt that the case was "litigated in
the shadow of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause."1 5 6 Justice
Scalia pointed out that Summum tried to exploit the City's hesitation to
adopt the monument's message because it would raise Establishment
Clause issues.1 5' Accordingly, the City was cautious in associating itself too
closely with the Ten Commandments monument already placed in the
park. 58 Justice Scalia contended that the City should be confident that it
"[did] not violate any part of the First Amendment."' 59 Justice Scalia cited
a factually similar case involving a Ten Commandments monument dis-
played on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol in which all the justices
rejected an Establishment Clause argument because "the Ten Command-
ments 'have an undeniable historical meaning' in addition to their 'relig-
ious significance.' "160
D. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer authored a concurring opinion in which he agreed with
the majority but on the understanding that "the 'government speech' doc-
trine is a rule of thumb, not a rigid category." 161 Justice Breyer stated that
the Court should categorize types of speech as "government speech," "pub-
lic forum," "limited public forum," or "nonpublic forum.1.62 He further
stated that the Court should look beyond the initial categorization and de-
termine whether the "government action burdens speech disproportion-
ately in light of the action's tendency to further a legitimate government
objective."163 Applying this view to the instant case, Justice Breyer be-
lieved that the City "[did] not disproportionately restrict Summum's free-
dom of expression" and, therefore, the City's action was lawful.164 The
City did not close off its parks to speech; it merely reserved space in its
park to further recreational, historical, educational, aesthetic, and/or any
other civic interest. 165
E. Justice Souter's Concurrence in the Judgment
Lastly, Justice Souter concurred in the judgment, as he agreed that the
Ten Commandments monument was government speech, but had qualms
155. Id.












"about accepting the position that public monuments are government
speech categorically."' 66 Justice Souter stated that the Court should move
slowly in establishing the boundaries of the government speech doctrine, as
it is "recently minted," and its interaction with the Establishment Clause
has not been worked out.167 He warned that government entities should be
careful in accepting monuments of a religious nature in order to prevent
Establishment Clause violations.' 6 8 In such instances, Justice Souter ad-
vised government entities to accept other monuments "to dilute the ap-
pearance of adopting whatever particular religious position" for which the
monument might stand.' 69 Justice Souter urged the Court to keep govern-
ment speech issues as open and simple as possible and recognize that there
are instances when government maintenance of monuments will not look
like government speech at all.170 Justice Souter favored a "reasonable ob-
server test" over a per se rule to say when speech is governmental.' 7 ' The
"reasonable observer test," as espoused by Justice Souter, relied on
whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would understand the
expression of the monument to be government speech rather than private
speech and would spot violations of the Establishment Clause.' 72 Justice
Souter relied on this "reasonable observer test" to find that the monument
in question was government expression.' 7 3
V. ANALYSIS
Although the Pleasant Grove Court's holding is analytically sound, the
opinion is far from clear as to future cases involving public forums and
government speech. This Note recommends that the Court reach the same
conclusion, but by classifying the type of speech involved, as well as suffi-
ciently addressing the forum in question. By re-evaluating and fully analyz-
ing the forum, the Court could have properly categorized the monuments
within the park-instead of assuming that the monuments were govern-
ment speech and merely touching that a public park is traditionally a public
forum. By correctly classifying the forum, the Court's holding would have
more reasonably explained the City's selection process for privately
donated monuments.
This analysis will address the implications of the Court's failure to ade-
quately address the forum in question, as well as set out a new three-pro-
nged approach to evaluating all types of public speech, not limited solely to
evaluating monuments. By adopting such an approach, the Pleasant Grove
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Additionally, this approach would have fully evaluated future claims re-
garding Establishment Clause issues, even in situations where the issue is
not raised in the case but there is a clear question as to a violation of the
Establishment Clause.
A. Implications of Pleasant Grove City v. Summum
and Where the Court Went Wrong
Essentially, the Court's holding fails to flesh out areas that would clar-
ify its intentions and reasoning for deciding that the Ten Commandments
monument in question constituted government speech. The Court jumped
to the conclusion that the monuments were in a public park, and a public
park is a public forum. However, in doing so, the Court failed to properly
categorize the type of speech in question, which led to a blurring of the
lines between private speech in a public forum and government speech.
Additionally, the Court's failure to adequately address an underlying
Establishment Clause issue begs the question of whether Summum can
bring a future claim for an Establishment Clause violation. The Court's
holding allows for a proverbial re-bite at the apple of the Establishment
Clause because the Court held that adoption of the message was not neces-
sary. Therefore, the Court did not definitely terminate a future Establish-
ment Clause claim.
B. A New Approach: A Three-Pronged Approach
Although the Pleasant Grove decision is supported by the law, the
Court failed to properly analyze the forum in question and attempted to
distinguish between private speech in a public forum and government
speech. However, by improperly classifying the forum, the Court failed to
adequately justify its conclusion that the Ten Commandments monument
was government speech.
This Note proposes a new approach, combining the two lines of prece-
dent involving private speech in a public forum and government speech
into one test, and which allows for a more comprehensive approach to dis-
tinguish the two. This approach would allow for forum analysis and dis-
crimination analysis without abruptly defining speech as government
speech, in order to avoid a Free Speech Clause violation. The Court should
have gone through all three prongs (forum, government speech, and dis-
crimination) so that it could have fully justified its conclusion and given a
more conclusive precedent for future cases. The Court would still have
arrived at the same result that this was indeed government speech and the
government has the right to speak for itself, to say what it wishes, and to
select the views that it wants to express.174 By adding the discrimination
prong, the Court could have addressed content without an Establishment
Clause issue raised and prevented future claims.
174. Id. at 1131.
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Additionally, this approach would allow for less questioning of the
government because it would fully justify the Court's decision on whether
the content is government speech-instead of the current approach where
the Court simply says it is government speech; thus, it is permissible to
discriminate. The new approach would do a better job of explaining why
the Court came to this conclusion.
1. First Prong: The Forum Analysis
Although it might seem redundant to go through a complete forum
analysis to then ultimately classify the speech as government speech, it is an
essential step in order to justify the government's actions in limiting access
to the forum. The Pleasant Grove Court cited previous caselaw concerning
forums, but failed to adequately explain its conclusion.'75 Because the
Court did not go through the complete forum analysis, the Court improp-
erly classified the forum. The forum was not simply a public park, but a
permanent monument within a public park, and would have been better
classified as a non-public forum because public forums provide for tempo-
rary types of access.
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc., the Supreme Court
adopted a two-step forum analysis, stating that simply identifying the prop-
erty is not enough; the Court must also look at the "access sought by the
speaker."176 The Pleasant Grove Court failed to do this analysis and simply
stated that because Pioneer Park was a public park it was a public forum.
Thus, the Court improperly classified the forum at issue. The two-step fo-
rum analysis includes the following:
(1) identifying the forum in terms of both the property at issue (e.g., a
public library), as well as the type of access sought by the speaker
(e.g., distributing leaflets or an organized demonstration), and
(2) classifying the nature of the forum (traditional public forum, desig-
nated public forum, limited public forum, nonpublic forum[,] or no
forum.' 77
Applying this test to the instant case, The Pleasant Grove Court likely
would have found that the forum was improperly classified because the
Court failed to identify the type of access sought by the speaker.178 The
Court's holding in Cornelius implicitly mandates that determining the ac-
cess sought (i.e., temporary or permanent types of expression) is a critical
175. Id.
176. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985).
177. Brief of Amici Curiae American Humanist Association et al. Supporting Neither Party,
Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (No. 07-0655), 2008 WL 2511782, at *10 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S.
at 801) [hereinafter American Humanist Association Amicus Brief].
178. American Humanist Association Amicus Brief, supra note 177, at *11 (citing Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 801).
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step in forum analysis. 17 9 By properly identifying the access sought, the
Court could have properly identified the forum, which would have led to
the correct classification.18 0
After applying the forum analysis, the forum would be properly identi-
fied as "permanent monuments in a city park." 8 1 Although the Pleasant
Grove Court hinted at the correct forum determination by distinguishing
temporary speeches and demonstrations from permanent monuments, the
Court failed to change the classification from public forum to non-public
forum.182 Although a public park is traditionally a public forum in regards
to speeches and demonstrationsa1 8  a public park is not a public forum for
permanent monuments; this is because public parks do not have a long
tradition of allowing the public to freely display permanent monuments.184
Some type of approval is necessary for the installation of permanent monu-
ments in public parks, because "[n]o reasonable person would assert the
right to bring in a bull-dozer, dig up the earth, and erect a large stone mon-
ument on his own initiative, without first inquiring as to the procedures and
seeking governmental approval."' 8 5 Therefore, a "permanent monument
in a city park" is not a public forum, but a non-public forum based on
history and nature of use.
A non-public forum is public property that is not traditionally desig-
nated as a public forum and is governed by different standards, as the
"First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it
is owned or controlled by the government."1 8 6 In a non-public forum, the
government may impose content-based restrictions, but may not impose
viewpoint-based restrictions.18 7 Since the forum is not open to the general
public, the government property is not a public forum and the government
may restrict access.18 Using public parks for public speeches and protests
would be opening the park to the general public; however, placing monu-
ments in a public park is not open to the public, as the park would quickly
become overrun. By properly classifying the forum as non-public, the
Court would then have had less trouble justifying the monument as govern-
ment speech and could have moved to the second prong of the analysis.
179. American Humanist Association Amicus Brief, supra note 177, at *12 (citing Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 789).
180. American Humanist Association Amicus Brief, supra note 177, at *12 (citing Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 789).
181. American Humanist Association Amicus Brief, supra note 177, at *11.
182. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct at 1137; see supra text accompanying notes 145-47 discussing
the classification of a park as a public forum.
183. See Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1054 (10th Cir. 2002).
184. American Humanist Association Amicus Brief, supra note 177, at *12-13 (citing Hague v.
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
185. Brief of Amici Curiae International Municipal Lawyers Association Supporting Petitioners,
Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (No. 07-0655), 2008 WL 2550618, at *5 [hereinafter International
Municipal Lawyers Association Amicus Brief].
186. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.
188. Perry Educ Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 47-48.
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2. Second Prong: Government Speech Analysis
Although the Court failed to properly classify the forum, the Pleasant
Grove Court correctly classified the monument as government speech. A
city's decision to allow a privately donated monument to be displayed in a
public park fits in with the Supreme Court's prior "speech selection cases."
Thus, where a city's decision to include certain monuments and exclude
others is based on content and not viewpoint, the city is allowed to express
preferences between speakers. 189
When the government controls the message, it "is not precluded from
relying on the government speech doctrine merely because it solicits assis-
tance from non-governmental sources in developing specific messages,"
when it approved every word that was communicated.' 90 In other words,
although the Fraternal Order of the Eagles donated the monument, the
City can classify the monument as its own because it approved its place-
ment within the park. Additionally, a statement engraved on the monu-
ment stating that the Fraternal Order of Eagles presented the monument to
the City supports the finding of government speech. 191 Inscriptions of this
nature imply that the government owns and controls the monument.192
Moreover, when a privately donated monument is permanently placed in a
public park, reasonable people would believe that the city was involved
and had previously granted permission.
The Supreme Court could have gone further with the government
speech analysis and adopted the Tenth Circuit's four-factor government
speech test laid out in International Municipal Lawyers Association's ami-
cus curiae brief.193 The four factors are as follows: (1) the main purpose of
the speech in question; (2) the amount of editorial control by the govern-
ment entity; (3) the identity of the literal speaker; and (4) whether the ulti-
mate responsibility for the content rested with the government entity. 194
3. Third Prong: Discrimination Analysis
After correctly deciding the first two prongs of the analysis, the third
prong is quite easy. The correct forum distinction makes all the difference
in justifying the Court's holding. "Because the forum here is non-public,
the City has the right to deny private parties permission to install perma-
nent monuments in the [p]ark so long as the City acts in a reasonable and
189. International Municipal Lawyers Association Amicus Brief, supra note 185, at *11 (citing
Nat'l Endowment of the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Ark. Edu. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666 (1998)).
190. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
191. American Humanist Association Amicus Brief, supra note 177, at *9.
192. American Humanist Association Amicus Brief, supra note 177, at *9.
193. International Municipal Lawyers Association Amicus Brief, supra note 185, at *18; see, e.g.,
Ariz. Life Coalition, Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2008); wells v. City & County of Denver, 257
F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001); Knights of the KKK v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir.
2000).
194. International Municipal Lawyers Association Amicus Brief, supra note 185, at *18.
1432011]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
viewpoint-neutral manner."19 5 Content discrimination is defined as speech
discrimination based on subject matter, whereas viewpoint discrimination is
defined as "speech discrimination based on the speaker's motivating ideol-
ogy, opinion, or perspective, which is generally unacceptable if the speech
is otherwise within the forum's limitations."196
Likewise, in Cornelius, the Court applied a reasonable standard, stat-
ing that "[t]he [g]overnment's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic fo-
rum need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the
only reasonable limitation."197 A government entity has the right to make
"distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker
identity."198
The Court's classification of the monuments as a public forum re-
quired the Court to walk a fine line to justify the City's exclusion of Sum-
mum's monument, because when speakers and subjects are similarly
situated, the state may not pick and choose. On the contrary, if the govern-
ment property is a non-public forum, not all speech is equally situated, and
the state may discriminate based on the purpose for which the public prop-
erty is being used. The Cornelius Court further stated that "[n]othing in
the Constitution requires the [g]overnment freely to grant access to all who
wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of [g]overnment
property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption
that might be caused by the speaker's activities."1 99 Because the govern-
ment, like an owner of private property, has the power "to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated," the
Court has adopted a method of forum analysis by determining whether the
government's interest in using the property for its intended purpose "out-
weighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for other pur-
poses."2 00 Moreover:
[A] speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he
wishes to address a topic not encompassed with in the pur-
pose of the forum, or if he is not a member of the class of
speakers for whose especial benefit for the forum was cre-
ated, the government violates the First Amendment when
the government when it denies access to a speaker solely to
suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise in-
cludible subject. 2 0 '
195. American Humanist Association Amicus Brief, supra note 177, at *16 (citing Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 806).
196. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995).
197. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985).
198. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
199. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800.
200. Id. at 800 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)).
201. Id. at 806.
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Because Summum did not meet the criteria laid out by the City by
having a historical tie to the City or relate to the history of Pleasant Grove,
the City was justified in refusing Summum's request to erect the Seven
Aphorisms of Summum monument. The Fraternal Order of the Eagles had
a historical tie to the City, whereas Summum did not.
Although Summum argued that the City was engaged in viewpoint dis-
crimination, the Court in Rust held that the government can constitution-
ally choose to fund certain initiatives which it feels are in the public's
interest, without having to fund an alternative initiative.202 This is not con-
sidered viewpoint discrimination, but merely a selection to fund one activ-
ity without funding another. 203
Furthermore, as the International Municipal Lawyers Association
cleverly pointed out, Summum maintained the right to use the City's parks
through traditional public forum speech activities such as speeches, demon-
strations, or literature distribution.204 Summum may even use the monu-
ment's presence as a motivation for counter-speech, but ultimately the First
Amendment does not require the City to allow it to erect a permanent
monument within the park. 205
Using the discrimination prong, the Court could have taken the oppor-
tunity to dispel an Establishment Clause claim (even though it was not
brought before the Court in this case). When faced with an Establishment
Clause violation, neutrality is not offended "when the government, follow-
ing neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients
whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and
diverse." 206 Here, Pleasant Grove used neutral criteria in determining
which monuments it accepted. The monuments had to either directly re-
late to the City's history or be donated by a group with longstanding ties to
the community.207
Additionally, the City had an array of monuments within Pioneer
Park, including monuments of a historic granary, a wishing well, the City's
first fire station, a September 11 monument, and the Ten Commandments
monument-all of which collectively illustrate a broad selection of view-
points. There would have been more cause for concern if the City had
created the forum to advance religion or aid a religious cause; however,
that was not the City's intent with the selection of monuments.208 The pro-
gram was merely instituted to provide a forum for speech and allow the
construction of monuments by various groups, including the Fraternal Or-
der of Eagles.2 09
202. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
203. Id.
204. International Municipal Lawyers Association Amicus Brief, supra note 185, at *30-31.
205. International Municipal Lawyers Association Amicus Brief, supra note 185, at *30.31.
206. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995).
207. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1130 (2009).
208. See Rosenburger, 515 U.S. at 840.
209. Id.
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C. This New Approach Would Prevent Summum from Re-litigating to
Assert an Establishment Clause Claim.
Although most actions involving Ten Commandments monuments are
brought as Establishment Clause violations, in Pleasant Grove, Summum
alleged a Free Speech Clause violation, but the claim was nonetheless de-
cided in the shadow of an Establishment Clause violation. By adopting the
three-pronged approach, the Court could have reiterated Van Orden and
proverbially "killed two birds with one stone" by preventing a subsequent
Establishment Clause claim.
1. Although it was not brought before the Court in Pleasant Grove,
Summum saved its potential Establishment Clause claim so
that if the Court ruled in its favor and required the City
to "adopt" the monument's message, there would be
a clear Establishment Clause violation.
Although Summum chose not to originally pursue an Establishment
Clause violation, as Justice Scalia correctly stated during oral arguments,
Summum will likely be back to challenge the Ten Commandments monu-
ment on Establishment Clause grounds.2 10 In an earlier case, Summum
requested that a Ten Commandments monument be removed because it
was an Establishment Clause violation.2 1' But after its request was denied,
Summum requested that its monument also be displayed.212 In other
words, Summum was merely trying to strengthen its future Establishment
Clause claim by asking the Court to require the City to "adopt" the monu-
ment's language.
By pure technicality, the Pleasant Grove Court glazed over a looming
Establishment Clause issue, instead of combining the Establishment Clause
analysis adopted in Van Orden with the government speech analysis to
show that no further claim would exist.213 The Court could not only have
shown that the monument constituted government speech, but also ad-
dressed the content of the monuments.
The Supreme Court in Widmar used a three-prong test to determine if
a policy would offend the Establishment Clause: "First, the [governmental
policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . .
finally, the [policy] must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion.' "214
210. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1125 (referencing Justica Scalia's statements during oral
argument, available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_07_665).
211. American Humanist Association Amnicus Brief, supra note 177, at *6 (citing Summum v. City
of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 998 (10th Cir. 2002)).
212. American Humanist Association Amicus Brief, supra note 177, at *6.
213. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
214. widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981).
146 [VOL. 30:121
CLEAR AS MUD
2. The Ten Commandments Are Not Necessarily Religious.
This case has been "litigated in the shadow of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause," 215 due to its express showing of a religious passage,
so why not clear up any confusion as to a future claim, as Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion has eased all fears that the monument "does not violate
any part of the First Amendment"?216
The majority could have easily incorporated its holding in Van Orden
to ease concerns about the possible Establishment Clause violation and
possibly prevent other claims in the future. In Van Orden, the Court held
that the Ten Commandments "have an undeniable historical meaning" in
addition to their "religious significance" and do not offend the Establish-
ment Clause.21'7 The Van Orden Court stated that "[w]hile the Command-
ments are religious . .. [s]imply having religious content or promoting a
message consistent with iA religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Es-
tablishment Clause." 21 8 Concurring in Van Orden, Justice Breyer stated:
"Despite the Commandments' religious message, an inquiry into the con-
text in which the text of the Commandments is used demonstrates that the
Commandments also convey a secular moral message about proper stan-
dards of social conduct and a message about the historic relation between
those standards and the law." 219 Justice Breyer also stated that individuals
visiting the capitol grounds, much like the park in Pleasant Grove, were
more likely to view the Ten Commandments as a moral and historical mes-
sage rather than the religious aspects of the tablets.220
Whether the Ten Commandments are a violation of the Establishment
Clause in a given situation,
[would] depend[ ] on what the government speech consists
of, what it is the government is saying about the Ten Com-
mandments. If the government is saying the Ten Command-
ments are the word of God, that's one thing, and if the
government is saying the Ten Commandments are impor-
tant to our national heritage, that's something else. 221
If the speech closely resembles the first example, it is not a far stretch
to see a valid Establishment Clause violation; however, Pleasant Grove's
monument more closely resembles the second example and is free from
First Amendment scrutiny. Had the Court applied the principles that the
Van Orden Court laid out, the holding would have clearly shown that the
monument did not violate the Establishment Clause-instead of ignoring
215. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1140 (quoting Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690).
218. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677.
219. Id. at 701.
220. Id.
221. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1125 (referencing Justica Scalia's statements during oral
argument, available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_07_665).
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the issue all together. Also, lower courts would have had a more compre-
hensive precedent to follow in future cases.
By adopting the three-pronged approach, the discrimination prong
would have provided the Court with an avenue to address the Establish-
ment Clause issue. The discrimination prong also would have clearly
shown that Summum's future claim would be dead in the water, as the Ten
Commandments are not solely religious.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should have used the opportunity in Pleasant
Grove to clarify precedent on the issue of distinguishing government
speech from private speech on public property and illustrate a more exten-
sive approach to government speech by incorporating forum analysis and
addressing the looming Establishment Clause issue through the discrimina-
tion prong. By adopting the three-prong analysis set out in this Note, the
Court's holding would have seemed far more justified by addressing all the
issues rather than merely saving the City from liability. By simply adding
the forum analysis and correctly classifying the privately donated monu-
ments in a public park as a non-public forum, the Court's holding would
have been instantly more credible and convincing.
148 [VOL. 30:121
